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Abstract. This paper presents the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. The in-
sight from Part I of this series that Born’s rule has its limitations – hence cannot be the
foundation of quantum physics – opens the way for an alternative interpretation: the ther-
mal interpretation of quantum physics. It gives new foundations that connect quantum
physics (including quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, quantum field theory and
their applications) to experiment.
The thermal interpretation resolves the problems of the foundations of quantum physics
revealed in the critique from Part I. It improves the traditional foundations in several
respects:
• The thermal interpretation reflects the actual practice of quantum physics, especially
regarding its macroscopic implications.
• The thermal interpretation gives a fair account of the interpretational differences between
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory.
• The thermal interpretation gives a natural, realistic meaning to the standard formalism
of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in a single world, without introducing
additional hidden variables.
• The thermal interpretation is independent of the measurement problem. The latter
becomes a precise problem in statistical mechanics rather than a fuzzy and problematic
notion in the foundations. Details will be discussed in Part III.
For the discussion of questions related to this paper, please use the discussion forum
https://www.physicsoverflow.org.
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1 Introduction
In a statistical description of nature only expectation values or correla-
tions are observable.
Christof Wetterich, 1997 [57]
One is almost tempted to assert that the usual interpretation in terms
of sharp eigenvalues is ’wrong’, because it cannot be consistently main-
tained, while the interpretation in terms of expectation values is ’right’,
because it can be consistently maintained.
John Klauder, 1997 [26, p.6]
This paper presents the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. The insight from Part I
[38] of this series was that Born’s rule has its limitations and hence cannot be the foundation
of quantum physics. Indeed, a foundation that starts with idealized concepts of limited
validity is not a safe ground for interpreting reality.
The analysis of Part I opens the way for an alternative interpretation – the thermal in-
terpretation of quantum physics. It gives new foundations that connect all of quantum
physics (including quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, quantum field theory and
their applications) to experiment.
Quantum physics, as it is used in practice, does much more than predicting probabilities for
the possible results of microscopic experiments. This introductory textbook scope is only
the tip of an iceberg. Quantum physics is used to determine the behavior of materials made
of specific molecules under changes of pressure or temperature, their response to external
electromagnetic fields (e.g., their color), the production of energy from nuclear reactions,
the behavior of transistors in the microchips on which modern computers run, and a lot
more. Indeed, it appears to predict the whole of macroscopic, phenomenological equilibrium
and nonequilibrium thermodynamics in a quantitatively correct way.
Motivated by this fact, this paper defines and discusses a new interpretation of quantum
physics, called the thermal interpretation. It is based on the lack of a definite boundary
between the macroscopic and the microscopic regime, and an application of Ockham’s
razor [44, 24], frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora – that we should opt for
the most economic model explaining a regularity.
Essential use is made of the fact that everything physicists measure is measured in a ther-
mal environment for which statistical thermodynamics is relevant. This is reflected in the
characterizing adjective ’thermal’ for the interpretation. The thermal interpretation agrees
with how one interprets measurements in thermodynamics, the macroscopic part of quan-
tum physics, derived via statistical mechanics. Extrapolating from the macroscopic case,
the thermal interpretation considers the functions of the state (or of the parameters charac-
terizing a state from a particular family of states) as the beables, the conceptual equivalent
of objective properties of what really exists. Some of these are accessible to experiment –
namely the expectation values of quantities that have a small uncertainty and vary suffi-
ciently slowly in time and space. Because of the law of large numbers, all thermodynamic
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variables are in this category. By its very construction, the thermal interpretation naturally
matches the classical properties of our quantum world.
Section2 gives a detailed motivation of the thermal interpretation and a precise definiton
of its basic credo. We introduce the Ehrenfest picture of quantum mechanics, the abstract
mathematical framework used throughout. It describes a closed, deterministic dynamics
for q-expectations (expectation values of Hermitian operators). We discuss the ontological
status of the thermal interpretation, making precise the concept of properties of a quantum
system, the concept of uncertainty, and the notion of an ensemble. Based on this, we give
a formal definition of the thermal interpretation,
In Section 3 we consider the way the thermal interpretation represents statistical and prob-
abilistic aspects of quantum theory. We begin with a discussion of two formal notions of
classical probability, their relation to the probability concept used in applied statistics, and
their dependence on the description used. We then show how the statistical aspects of the
quantum formalism naturally follow from the weak law of large numbers.
In Section 4, we show that the fact that in relativistic quantum field theory, position is a
classical parameter while in quantum mechanics it is an uncertain quantity strongly affects
the relation between quantum field theory and reality. Among the beables of quantum field
theory are smeared field expectations and pair correlation functions, which encode most of
what is of experimental relevance in quantum field theory. We discuss notions of causality
and nonlocality and their relation to the thermal interpretation.
We also discuss relativistic quantum field theory at finite times, a usually much neglected
topic essential for a realistic interpretation of the universe in terms of quantum field theory.
According to the thermal interpretation, quantum physics is the basic framework for the
description of objective reality (including everything reproducible studied in experimental
physics), from the smallest to the largest scales, including the universe as a whole (cf.
Subsection 4.3). Classical descriptions are just regarded as limiting cases where Planck’s
constant h¯ can be set to zero without significant loss of quality of the resulting models.
Except for a brief discussion of the measurement of probabilities in Subsection 3.5, every-
thing related to the thermal interpretation of measurement is postponed to Part III [39]
of this series of papers. There it is shown that the thermal interpretation satisfactorily re-
solves the main stumbling blocks in a clear description of the relation between the quantum
formalism and experimental reality.
Hints at a possible thermal interpretation of quantum physics go back at least to 1997; see
the above quotes by Wetterich and Klauder. A recent view closely related to the thermal
interpretation is the 2017 work by Allahverdyan et al. [1]. The thermal interpretation
of quantum physics itself emerged from my foundational 2003 paper Neumaier [32]. It was
developed by me in discussions on the newsgroups de.sci.physik, starting in Spring 2004;
for the beginnings see Neumaier [34]. A first version of it was fully formalized (without
naming the interpretation) in Sections 5.1, 5.4 and Chapter 7 of the 2008 edition of the
online book by Neumaier & Westra [41]; see also Sections 8.1, 8.4 and Chapter 10
of the 2011 edition. The name ’thermal interpretation’ appeared first in a 2010 lecture
(Neumaier [35]). Later I created a dedicated website on the topic (Neumaier [37]).
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The bulk of this paper is intended to be nontechnical and understandable for a wide audience
being familiar with some traditional quantum mechanics. For the understanding of the main
issues, the knowledge of some basic terms from functional analysis is assumed; these are
precisely defined in many mathematics books. However,quite a number of remarks are
addressed to experts and then refer to technical aspects explained in the references given.
In the bibliography, the number(s) after each reference give the page number(s) where it is
cited.
Acknowledgments. Earlier versions of this paper benefitted from discussions with Hen-
drik van Hees, Rahel Kno¨pfel and Mike Mowbray.
2 The thermal interpretation of quantum mechanics
In this section we give a precise definiton of the basic credo of the thermal interpretation.
Subsection 2.1 introduces the abstract mathematical framework in terms of a Lie product
structure on the set of all q-expectations. This induces a Lie–Poisson bracket in terms of
which q-expectations behave dynamically as a classical Hamiltonian system, with a dynam-
ics given by the Ehrenfest theorem. This Ehrenfest picture of quantum mechanics is used
throughout. Subsection 2.2 discusses the ontological status of the thermal interpretation,
making precise the concept of properties of a quantum system. The next two subsections
clarify the concepts of uncertainty and the notion of an ensemble. The final Subsection 2.5
then gives a formal definition of the thermal interpretation,
2.1 The Ehrenfest picture of quantum mechanics
As first observed in 1925 by Dirac [11], classical mechanics and quantum mechanics look
very similar when written in terms of the Poisson bracket.
Quantities are represented in classical mechanics by functions from a space of suitable
smooth phase space functions A(p, q), and in quantum mechanics by linear operators A on
a suitable Euclidean space. We define the classical Lie product
A∠B := {B,A} = ∂pA∂qB − ∂pB∂qA (1)
(read ∠ as ’Lie’) of classical quantities A,B, and the quantum Lie bracket
A∠B :=
i
h¯
[A,B] =
i
h¯
(AB − BA) (2)
of quantum mechanical quantities A,B. This infix notation is much more comfortable than
the customary bracket notation. In both cases, it is easy to verify anticommutativity,
A∠B = −B ∠A,
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the product rule
A∠BC = (A∠B)C +B(A∠C),
and the Jacobi relation
A∠ (B∠C) = (A∠B)∠C +B ∠ (A∠C).
This shows that ∠ tuns the space of quantities into a Lie algebra. It also shows that the
application of a∠ to a quantity behaves like differentiation.
We also write
∫
both for the Liouville integral
∫
A :=
∫
A(p, q)dp dq (3)
of a classical quantity A and for the trace∫
A := TrA (4)
of a quantum mechanical quantity A. With this notation, it is easy to verify the invariance
under infinitesimal canonical transformations,∫
A∠B = 0,
from which one finds the integration by parts formula∫
(A∠B)C =
∫
A(B ∠C).
In the general theory, for which we refer to Neumaier [32, 33], these rules are part of a
system of axioms for Euclidean Poisson algebras, which allows one to develop everything
without reference to either the classical or the quantum case.
Quantities and linear functionals are, in general, time-dependent; so we write 〈f〉t for the
q-expectation of f(t) at time t. In maximal generality, a q-expectation is written in the
form
〈A〉t :=
∫
ρ(t)A(t), (5)
where A(t) is an arbitrary time-dependent quantity and ρ(t) a time-dependent density
operator, a nonnegative Hermitian operator normalized by∫
ρ = 1.
Their dynamics is given by
A˙(t) = H1(t)∠A(t) (6)
for quantities A,1
ρ˙(t) = ρ(t)∠H2(t) (7)
1 More generally, if z is a vector of quantities satisfying (6), quantities given by expressions A(t) =
A(z(t), t) with an explicit time dependence satisfy instead of (6) a differential equation of the form
A˙(t) = i[H1(t), A(t)] + ∂tA(z(t), t).
This follows easily from (6) and the chain rule. The generality gained is only apparent since the numbers
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for the density operator ρ; note the different treatment of quantities and the density oper-
ator! Here H1(t) and H2(t) are arbitrary time-dependent expressions without independent
physical meaning; they need not satisfy the differential equations (6) or (7). Integrating
(7) shows that
∫
ρ is time independent, so that the dynamics is consistent with the normal-
ization of ρ.
As a consequence of the dynamical assumptions (6)– (7), the q-expectations (5) have a
deterministic dynamics, given by
d
dt
〈A〉t = 〈H ∠A〉t, (8)
We call (8) the Ehrenfest equation since the special case of this equation where A is a
position or momentum variable and H = p
2
2m
+ V (q) is the sum of kinetic and potential
energy was found in 1927 by Ehrenfest [14]. Due to the canonical commutation rules,
we have
d
dt
〈q〉t = 〈H ∠ q〉t = 〈p〉t
m
,
d
dt
〈p〉t = 〈H ∠ p〉t = 〈−∇V (q)〉t. (9)
Note that the Ehrenfest equation does not involve notions of reality or measurement, hence
belongs to the formal core of quantum mechanics and is valid independent of interpretation
issues.
The product rule implies that
d
dt
〈A〉t only depends on the sum H = H1+H2, not on H1 and
H2 separately. Thus there is a kind of gauge freedom in specifying the dynamics, which
can be fixed by choosing either H1 or H2 arbitrarily. Fixing H1 = 0 (so that H2 = H)
makes all quantities A time-independent and defines the Schro¨dinger picture. Fixing
H1 as a reference Hamiltonian without interactions (so that H2 = V := H − H1 is the
interaction) defines the interaction picture. Fixing H2 = 0 (so that H1 = H) makes
the density operator ρ time-independent and defines the Heisenberg picture. In the
Heisenberg picture, one finds that
〈φ(u)〉s = 〈φ(u+ s− t)〉t (10)
for arbitrary times s, t, u, w, . . ..
The Schro¨dinger picture is fully compatible with the formal core of quantum physics, com-
prising the postulates (A1)–(A6) discussed in Subsection 2.1 of Part I [38]. In particular,
〈A(z(t), t)〉t are expressible in terms of canonical ones: In terms of a Fourier expansion
A(z(t), t) =
∫
dωeiωtAω(z(t)),
we see that
〈A(z(t), t)〉t =
∫
dωeiωt〈Aω(z(t))〉t,
and the Aω(z(t)) are canonical quantities respecting (6). This allows us to limit the main text to the case
where A has no explicit t-dependence.
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the von Neumann equation
d
dt
ρ(t) =
i
h¯
[ρ(t), H ] for t ∈ [t1, t2], (11)
holds for closed systems, giving a deterministic dynamics for the density operator. As
discussed in Subsection 2.3 of Part I [38], one obtains the Schro¨dinger equation in the limit
of pure states.
In place of the traditional Heisenberg, Schro¨dinger, and interaction pictures, one can also
consider another equivalent picture, in which only q-expectations figure as dynamical vari-
ables. The name Ehrenfest picture is suggestive since, for the standard multiparticle
Hamiltonian and f = p, q, this reduces to the Ehrenfest equation. In terms of the Lie
bracket on q-expectations defined by the formula
〈A〉∠ 〈B〉 := 〈A∠B〉, (12)
the family of q-expectations becomes a Lie algebra L, and the Ehrenfest equation (8)
becomes
d
dt
〈A〉 = 〈H〉∠ 〈A〉. (13)
Equation (13) is quite remarkable as it is manifestly independent of how H is split and how
the time-dependent expectation is expressed as (5).
The Ehrenfest picture gives a complete picture of the (classical or) quantum kinematics
and a deterministic dynamics for the q-expectations that is equivalent to the Schro¨dinger
picture, the Heisenberg picture, and the interaction pictures.
It is interesting to interpret the above in terms of Hamiltonian dynamics on Poisson man-
ifolds. An extensive discussion of classical Hamiltonian dynamics on Poisson manifolds,
in particular using Lie–Poisson brackets, and its application to rigid rotors and fluid dy-
namical systems is given in Marsden & Ratiu [31]. A Poisson manifold is a smooth
manifold together with a Lie product on E = C∞(M) that turns E into a commutative
Poisson algebra. Associated with the Lie algebra L of q-expectations is the manifold L∗ of
continuous linear functionals on L. On E = C∞(L∗), a Lie product is given by the classi-
cal Lie–Poisson bracket which canonically extends the formula (12) to smooth functions of
q-expectations. This turns E into a commutative Poisson algebra, hence L∗ into a Poisson
manifold.2 In these terms, the Ehrenfest picture of quantum mechanics is just classical (but
nonsymplectic) Hamiltonian dynamics in the Poisson manifold L∗, with expected energy
〈H〉 as the classical Hamiltonian. In particular, as can also be seen directly, expected energy
is conserved.
2.2 Properties
The beables of a physical system in the sense of Bell [4, p.41] are the linear functionals
of its density operator ρ, called the state of the system, and any complex-valued func-
2 In terms of the symplectic Poisson algebra considered by Strocchi [53] to express the quantum
mechanical dynamics of pure states ψ, the present Poisson algebra corresponds to the Poisson subalgebra
of even functions of ψ.
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tion constructed from these. The linear functionals are in 1-to-1 correspondence with
q-expectations, i.e., expressions of the form3
A = 〈A〉 := Tr ρA, (14)
where A is a linear operator (or more generally a sesquilinear form) on the Euclidean space
H. By definition, all functions of q-expectations are beables, and all beables arise in this
way. T his gives a clear formal meaning to the notion of existence, an ontology: In the
thermal interpretation, something is said to exist, to be real, and to be objective – three
ways of expressing the same –, if and only if it can be expressed in terms of beables only.
As observed in 1927 by von Neumann [42, p.255] – who was the first to base quantum
mechanics upon expectations rather than probabiilties –, the specification of all expectations
determines the complete state (density operator) ρ. Thus every function of the state ρ can
be rewritten (in any fixed picture) as a function of q-expectations, hence is a beable.
Only a small set of beables are practically (approximately) observable. Clearly, anything
computable in quantum physics belongs there. Whenever we are able to compute some-
thing from raw measurements according to the rules of some meaningful protocol, and it
adequately agrees with something derivable from quantum physics, we call the result of
that computation a measurement of the latter. This correctly describes the practice of
measurement in its most general form. Formal details will be given in Part III [39].
We recall the rules (S1)–(S3) from Subsection 3.4 and (R) from Subsection 4.1 of Part I
[38] that we found necessary for a good interpretation:
(S1) The state of a system (at a given time) encodes everything that can be said about
the system, and nothing else.
(S2) Every property of a subsystem is also a property of the whole system.
(S3) The state of a system determines the state of all its subsystems.
(R) Something in real life ’is’ an instance of the theoretical concept if it matches the
theoretical description sufficiently well.
The problems that traditional interpretations have with the relation between the state of
a system and that of a subsystem were discussed in Subsection 3.4 of Part I [38]. They
are resolved in the thermal interpretation. Indeed, the use of density operators as states
implies that the complete state of a system completely and deterministically specifies the
complete state of every subsystem.
Rule (S1) holds in the thermal interpretation because everything that can be computed
from the state is a beable.
The other rules are satisfied in the thermal interpretation by making precise the notions of
’statement about a system’ and ’property of a system’.
3 Note that the density operator, viewed as a time-dependent object, is picture-dependent, but with the
corresponding time-dependence of the linear operator A as discussed in Subsection 2.1, the q-expectations
are picture-independent.
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A statement is a {true, false}-valued function of the state. A property of a system at
time t is a statement P such that P (ρ(t)) is true, where ρ(t) is the state of the system at
time t.
A subsystem of a system is specified by a choice declaring some of the quantities (q-
observables) of the system to be the distinguished quantities of the subsystem. This includes
a choice for the Hamiltonian of the subsystem. The dynamics of the subsystem is generally
not closed, hence not given by the Ehrenfest equation (13). However, in many cases, an
approximate closed dynamical description is possible; this will be discussed in more detail
in Part III [39].
Note that unlike in traditional interpretations, no tensor product structure is assumed.
However, suppose that the latter is present, H = HS ⊗ Henv, and the quantities of the
subsystem are the linear operators of HS⊗1. Then, without changing any of the predictions
for the subsystem, the Hilbert space of the subsystem may be taken to be the smaller Hilbert
space HS, and the quantities of the subsystem are the linear operators of HS . Then the
density operator of the subsystem is the reduced state obtained as the partial trace over
the environment Hilbert space Henv. In this sense, (S3) holds.
Rule (R) just amounts to a definition of what it means of something in real life to ’be an
X ’, where X is defined as a theoretical concept.
2.3 Uncertainty
A quantity in the general sense is a property ascribed to phenomena,
bodies, or substances that can be quantified for, or assigned to, a par-
ticular phenomenon, body, or substance. [...] The value of a physical
quantity is the quantitative expression of a particular physical quantity
as the product of a number and a unit, the number being its numerical
value.
Guide for the Use of the International System of Units (Taylor [54])
The uncertainty in the result of a measurement generally consists of
several components which may be grouped into two categories according
to the way in which their numerical value is estimated.
Type A. Those which are evaluated by statistical methods
Type B. Those which are evaluated by other means
[...] The quantities u2j may be treated like variances and the quantities
uj like standard deviations.
NIST Reference on Constants, Units, and Uncertainty [43]
Uncertainty permeates all of human culture, not only science. Everything quantified by real
numbers (as opposed to counting) is intrinsically uncertain because we cannot determine
a real number with arbitrary accuracy. Even counting objects or events is uncertain in
as much the criteria that determine the conditions under which something is counted are
ambiguous. (When does the number of people in a room change by one while someone
enters the door?)
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The thermal interpretation of quantum physics takes the virtually universal presence of
uncertainty as the most basic fact of science and gives it a quantitative expression. Some
of this uncertainty can be captured by probabilities and statistics, but the nature of much
of this uncertainty is conceptual. Thus uncertainty is a far more basic phenomenon than
statistics. It is an uncertainty in the notion of measurability itself. What does it mean to
have measured something?
To be able to answer this we first need clarity in the terminology. To eliminate any trace of
observer issues4 from the terminology, we use the word quantity (as recommended in the
above quote from the Guide to the International System of Units) or – in a more technical
context – q-observable5 whenever quantum tradition uses the word observable. Similarly,
to eliminate any trace of a priori statistics from the terminology, we frequently use the
terminology uncertain value (in [41] simply called value) instead of q-expectation value,
and uncertainty instead of q-standard deviation.
For the sake of definiteness consider the notion of uncertain position. This may mean two
things.
1. It may mean that the position could be certain, as in classical Newtonian physics, except
that we do not know the precise value. However, measurements of arbitrary accuracy are
at least conceivable.
2. It may mean that the position belongs to an extended object, such as a neutron star,
the sun, a city, a house, a tire, or a water wavelet. In this case, there is a clear approximate
notion of position, but it does not make sense to specify this position to within millimeter
accuracy.
It seems to be impossible to interpret the second case in terms of the first in a natural way.
The only physically distinguished point-like position of an extended object is its center of
mass. Classically, one could therefore think of defining the exact position of an extended
object to be the position of its center of mass. But the sun, a city, a house, or a water
wavelet do not even have a well-defined boundary, so even the definition of their center of
mass, which depends on what precisely belongs to the object, is ambiguous. And is a tire
really located at its center of mass – which is well outside the material the tire is made
of? Things get worse in the microscopic realm, where the center of mass of a system of
quantum particles has not even an exactly numerically definable meaning.
On closer inspection it seems that the situation of case 2 is very frequent in practice. Indeed,
it is the typical situation in the macroscopic, classical world. Case 1 appears to be simply
a convenient but unrealistic idealization.
4 Except when relating to tradition, we deliberately avoid the notion of observables, since it is not clear
on a fundamental level what it means to ‘observe’ something, and since many things (such as the fine
structure constant, neutrino masses, decay rates, scattering cross sections) observable in nature are only
indirectly related to what is traditionally called an ‘observable’ in quantum physics.
5 Note that renaming notions has no observable consequences, but strongly affects the interpretation. To
avoid confusion, I follow here as in Part I [38] the convention of Allahverdyan et al. [1] and add the prefix
’q-’ to all traditional quantum notions that get here a new interpretation and hence a new terminology. In
particular, we use the terms q-observable, q-expectation, q-variance, q-standard deviation, q-probability,
q-ensemble for the conventional terms observable, expectation, variance, standard deviation, probability,
and ensemble.
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The uncertainty in the position of macroscopic objects such as the sun, a city, a house, a
tire, or a water wavelet is therefore a conceptual uncertainty impossible to resolve by mea-
surement. The thermal interpretation asserts that quantum uncertainty is an uncertainty
of the same conceptual kind.
Thus uncertainty is only partially captured through statistical techniques. The latter apply
only in case of highly repetitive uncertain situations, leading to a particular kind of uncer-
tainty called aleatoric uncertainty (see, e.g., [10, 45]). More general kinds of uncertainty
are discussed in the NIST Reference on Constants, Units, and Uncertainty [43], which may
be regarded as the de facto scientific standard for representing uncertainty. This source
explicitly distinguishes between uncertainties ”which are evaluated by statistical methods”
and those ”which are evaluated by other means”. For the second category, it is recognized
that the uncertainties are not statistical but should be treated ”like standard deviations”.
The thermal interpretation follows this pattern by explicitly recognizing that not all uncer-
tainty can be expressed statistically, though it is expressed in terms of uncertainty formulas
that behave like the corresponding statistical concepts.
2.4 What is an ensemble?
We may imagine a great number of systems of the same nature, but
differing in the configurations and velocities which they have at a given
instant, and differing not merely infinitesimally, but it may be so as to
embrace every conceivable combination of configuration and velocities.
[...] The first inquiries in this field were indeed somewhat narrower in
their scope than that which has been mentioned, being applied to the
particles of a system, rather than to independent systems.
Josiah Willard Gibbs, 1902 [16, pp. vii–viii]
So aufgefaßt, scheint die Gibbssche Definition geradezu widersinnig.
Wie soll eine dem Ko¨rper wirklich eignende Gro¨ße abhangen nicht von
dem Zustand, den er hat, sondern den er mo¨glicherweise haben ko¨nnte?
[...] Es wird eine Gesamtheit mathematisch fingiert [...] erscheint es
schwierig, wenn nicht ausgeschlossen, dem Begriffe der kanonischen
Gesamtheit eine physikalische Bedeutung abzugewinnen.
Paul Hertz, 1910 [23, p.226f]
The thermal interpretation of quantum physics says that, consistent with statistical thermo-
dynanics, a q-expectation (q-ensemble mean) is interpreted as an in principle approximately
measurable quantity. Except when the statistical context is immediate (such as in com-
puter simulations), the q-expectation should not be interpreted as a statistical average over
a population6 of many realizations.
6 Physicists usually speak of an ensemble in place of a population. In this paper, the statistical term
population is used instead, to keep the discussion unambiguous, since in connection with the microcanon-
ical, canonical, or grand canonical ensemble the term ensemble is essentially synonymous with a density
operator of a particularly simple form.
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The q-expectation, conventionally called the ensemble expectation, becomes in the thermal
interpretation simply the uncertain value.
Therefore, the notion of q-ensemble is to be understood not as an actual repetition by
repeated preparation. It should be understood instead in the sense of a fictitious collection
of imagined copies of which only one is actually realized –, giving an intuitive excuse for
using the statistical formalism for a single system.
The association of a ficticious ensemble to single thermal systems goes back to Gibbs, the
founder of the ensemble approach to classical statistical mechanics. He was very aware that
thermodynamics and hence statistical mechanics applies to single physical systems. His
arguments are today as cogent as when he introduced them.
In classical statistical mechanics, the distinction between the deterministic and stochastic
description becomes blurred, as each single macroscopic system is already described by
a phase space density (multiparticle distribution function), although the latter behaves
mathematically in every respect like a probability density that expresses the properties of
a population of identical systems.
This tension in the terminology is already visible in the famous statistical mechanics text-
book by Gibbs [16] in 1902, where he introduced in the preface (from which the above
quote is taken) fictitious ensembles to bridge the conceptual gap.
Thus to deduce properties of macroscopic materials, Gibbs uses an ensemble of macroscopic
systems – in contrast to Boltzmann, who introduced statistical mechanics for gases by using
ensembles of microscopic atoms. Treating a collection of particles in a gas as an ensemble
(as Boltzmann did) makes statistical sense as there are a huge number of them. But the
Gibbs formalism is applied to single macroscopic systems such as a brick of iron rather than
to its many constituents. Treating a single system as part of a fictitious ensemble was a
very bold step taken by Gibbs [16, p.5]: ”Let us imagine a great number of independent
systems, identical in nature, but differing in phase, that is, in their condition with respect to
configuration and velocity.” This allowed him to extend Boltzmann’s work from ideal gases
to arbitrary chemical systems, in a very robust way. His statistical mechanics formalism,
as encoded in the textbook (Gibbs [16]), survived the quantum revolution almost without
change – the book reads almost like a modern book on statistical mechanics!
Though exceeedingly successful, Gibbs’ fictitious ensemble raised in his time severe objec-
tions in the physics community, such as the response by Hertz quoted above, who com-
plained that an ensemble is feigned mathematically. Of course Gibbs was aware that
imagined systems have no physical implications, but these were needed at a time where
mathematics had not yet the abstract character that it has today.
Today, mathematical theories are simply formal systems used without hesitation in appli-
cations in which the terms may mean something completely different from their meaning
in the uses that gave the names to the terms. For example, the mathematical notion of
a vector is today an abstract tool routinely used in contexts where the original geometric
notion of a vector is meaningless: No physicist thinks of a quantum mechanical state vector
in terms of a little arrow depicting a translational motion.
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In the same spirit, mathematical statistics (and hence statistical mechanics) may be used
as a tool in which expectation values figure as abstract notions without the need to imagine
an ensemble of copies of the single system under study over which the expectation would be
an imagined average. Thus we are liberated from having to think of the mathematical q-
expectation values manipulated in statistical mechanics as being true averages over fictitious
copies without a physical meaning. Instead, the statistical terminology is simply a reminder
of which laws (originally stemming from statistical data analysis) are applicable to these
values, in the same way as the geometric terminology of a vector indicates the laws valid
for manipulating objects behaving algebraically like vectors.
2.5 Formal definition of the thermal interpretation
Wenn wir aus jenem mathematischen Schema physikalische Resu-
late ableiten wollen, so mu¨ssen wir den quantentheoretischen Gro¨ßen,
also den Matrizen (oder ’Tensoren’ im mehrdimensionalen Raum)
Zahlen zuordnen. [...] Man kann also sagen: Jeder quantentheo-
retischen Gro¨ße oder Matrix la¨ßt sich eine Zahl, die ihren ’Wert’
angibt, mit einem bestimmten wahrscheinlichen Fehler zuordnen; der
wahrscheinliche Fehler ha¨ngt vom Koordinatensystem ab; fu¨r jede quan-
tentheoretische Gro¨ße gibt es je ein Koordinatensystem, in dem der
wahrscheinliche Fehler fu¨r diese Gro¨ße verschwindet. Ein bestimmtes
Experiment kann also niemals fu¨r alle quantentheoretischen Gro¨ßen
genaue Auskunft geben
Werner Heisenberg, 1927 [21, p.181f]
Wir hatten ja immer leichthin gesagt: die Bahn des Elektrons in der
Nebelkammer kann man beobachten. Aber vielleicht war das, was man
wirklich beobachtet, weniger. Vielleicht konnte man nur eine diskrete
Folge von ungenau bestimmten Orten des Elektrons wahrnehmen.
Tatsa¨chlich sieht man ja nur einzelne Wassertro¨pfchen in der Kammer,
die sicher sehr viel ausgedehnter sind als ein Elektron. Die richtige
Frage mußte also lauten: Kann man in der Quantenmechanik eine Sit-
uation darstellen, in der sich ein Elektron ungefa¨hr – das heißt mit
einer gewissen Ungenauigkeit – an einem gegebenen Ort befindet und
dabei ungefa¨hr – das heißt wieder mit einer gewissen Ungenauigkeit –
eine vorgegebene Geschwindigkeit besitzt, und kann man diese Unge-
nauigkeiten so gering machen, daß man nicht in Schwierigkeiten mit
dem Experiment gera¨t?
Werner Heisenberg, 1972 [22, p.77f]
The thermal interpretation of quantum physics uses for the description of quantum physics
a formal framework consisting of
• a Euclidean space H on which states are encoded by density operators, positive
semidefinite linear trace 1 operator ρ from H to itself (in the most regular case; to its
completion in the general case);
• a representation of the standard model of the electromagnetic, weak, and strong inter-
actions plus some form of gravity (not yet fully known) to describe the fundamental
field content;
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• a unitary representation of the Heisenberg, Galilei or Poincare´ group7 to account for
conservative dynamics and the principle of relativity in its nonrelativistic or special
relativistic situation, respectively;
• and the Ehrenfest picture for the dynamics of q-expectations.
The representation defines the basic physical quantities (linear operators on H) character-
izing the system – energy, momentum, angular momentum. H itself is a dense subspace of
the physical Hilbert space and forms a common domain for the basic physical quantities.
As described in Subsection 2.2 above, the state defines the properties a particular instance
of the system has, and hence what exists in the system.
The thermal interpretation avoids both the philosophically problematic notion of probabil-
ity, and the anthropomorphic notions of knowledge and measurement. (We shall reconsider
the notion of probability in Section 3, that of knowledge in Subsection 3.2, and that of
measurement in Part III [39].) Instead, it gives the q-expectation value an interpretation
in terms of a fundamental – not further explained but intuitive – notion of uncertainty,
generalizing statistical practice:
(GUP) General uncertainty principle: A Hermitian8 quantity A has the uncertain
value A = 〈A〉 with an uncertainty of9
σA :=
√〈
(A− A)2
〉
=
√
〈A2〉 − A2. (15)
In particular, the uncertain value A is informative whenever its uncertainty σA is much less
than |A|
This contrasts with the traditional interpretations, which give the q-expectation value an
interpretation in terms of a not further explained, fundamental notion of random mea-
surement or a not further explained, fundamental notion of knowledge (or information),
with all their associated foundational difficulties that were explored since Born proposed
his interpretation.
Much of quantum physics can be developed without using the notion of probability at
all. The notion of uncertain values 〈A〉 suffices for almost all of quantum chemistry and
7 Except for a few passing remarks concerning gravity, we assume in this paper a flat spacetime. In a
quantum field theory of gravity, we’d also need something like a unitary representation of the diffeomorphism
group of the spacetime manifold, which has its own foundational problems.
8 The uncertain value and its uncertainty makes also sense in the nonhermitian case, but the uncertainty
must be defined in this case as
σA :=
√〈
(A−A)∗(A−A)
〉
=
√
〈A∗A〉 − |A2|.
9 The equivalence of both expressions defining σA follows from A = 〈A〉 and
〈(A −A)2〉 = 〈A2 −AA−AA+A2〉 = 〈A2〉 − 〈A〉A−A〈A〉+A2 = 〈A2〉 −A2.
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quantum statistical mechanics. For equilibrium statistical mechanics, this can be seen from
the treatment in Neumaier & Westra [41].
As discovered by Heisenberg [21], quantum physics predicts its own uncertainty. The
q-variances of corresponding components of position q and momentum p cannot be both
arbitrarily small since
σpjσqj ≥
1
2
h¯.
This inequality is the famous Heisenberg uncertainty relation – not to be confused
with the general uncertainty principle (GUP) defined above. The Heisenberg uncertainty
relation is a special case of the more general statement (due to Robertson [50]) that for
non-commuting Hermitian operators A,B,
σAσB ≥ 1
2
|〈[A,B]〉|, (16)
which follows from the definitions.10 Like Ehrenfest’s equation, the Heisenberg uncertainty
relation does not involve notions of reality or measurement, hence belongs to the formal
core of quantum mechanics. Both are valid independent of the interpretation of the q-
expectations and the q-variances, respectively.
As discussed in Part I [38] (and exemplified in more detail in Part III [39] and Part IV
[40]), the interpretation, i.e., the identification of formal properties given by uncertain
values with real life properties of a physical system, is done by means of the generalized
uncertainty principle (GUP), interpreting the q-expectations as beables and the q-variances
as their uncertainty, together with
(CC) Callen’s criterion (Callen [7, p.15]): Operationally, a system is in a given state
if its properties are consistently described by the theory for this state.
This is enough to find out in each single case how to approximately measure the uncertain
value of a quantity of interest, though it may require considerable experimental ingenuity
to do so with low uncertainty. The uncertain value X is considered informative only when
its uncertainty σX is much less than |X|.
This interpretation gives both Ehrenfest’s equation and the Heisenberg uncertainty rela-
tion their practical importance: Ehrenfest’s equation leads to the emergence of classical
mechanics as approximate dynamics in cases where the variances are tiny (see Part IV [40]
for details). Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation enforces an unavoidable limit on the accuracy
with which position and momentum can be specified simultaneously.
In the thermal interpretation, even pointlike quantum objects are extended: Every pointlike
quantum object has a 3-component position vector q, hence is extended to the extent
10 Indeed, the relation remains unchanged when subtracting from A and B its q-expectation, hence it
suffices to prove it for the case where both q-expectations vanish. In this case, 〈A2〉 = σ2A and 〈B2〉 = σ2B,
and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality gives |〈AB〉|2 ≤ 〈A2〉〈B2〉 = σ2Aσ2B , hence |〈AB〉| ≤ σAσB. On the other
hand, one easily checks that i Im〈AB〉 = 1
2
〈[A,B]〉, so that 1
2
|〈[A,B]〉| = | Im〈AB〉| ≤ |〈AB〉|. Combining
both inequalities gives the assertion.
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determined by the computable position uncertainty σq =
√
σ2
q1
+ σ2
q2
+ σ2
q3
, where q is
the position vector of the object. In spacetime, the uncertain positions 〈q〉t traced out an
uncertain world line, and the quantum object can be visualizied as moving along a nested
family of fuzzy world tubes, the union of the intervals [〈q〉t − κσq(t), 〈q〉t + κσq(t)], for
reasonable κ of order one.
Thus the thermal interpretation answers Heisenberg’s question from the early days of quan-
tum mechanics quoted above, ”Can quantum mechanics represent the fact that an electron
finds itself approximately in a given place and that it moves approximately with a given ve-
locity, and can we make these approximations so close that they do not cause experimental
difficulties?” It gives the electrons real but uncertain paths, making them move along an
extended world tube rather than an infinitesimally thin world line.
3 Thermal interpretation of statistics and probability
In this section we consider the way the thermal interpretation represents statistical and
probabilistic aspects of quantum theory. We begin in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 with a dis-
cussion of two formal notions of classical probability, their relation to the probability concept
used in applied statistics, and their dependence on the description used.
Historically, the concept of classical probability (including its use in stochastic processes)
was given an undisputed formal mathematical foundation in 1933 in terms of the measure-
theoretic setting of Kolmogorov [27]. Apart from this traditional axiomatic foundation
of classical probability theory there is a less well-known equivalent axiomatic treatment by
Whittle [59] in terms of expectations. Here probabilities appear as the expectations of
statements, {0, 1}-valued random variables. von Plato [49] discusses the history of the
concept of probability. Kru¨ger et al. [28] discuss the history of probability in the various
fields of application. Sklar [52] discusses the philosophical problems of the probability
concept, with an emphasis on statistical mechanics.
Subsection 3.3 then shows how the statistical aspects of the quantum formalism naturally
follow from the weak law of large numbers. The notions of c-probability in the classical
case and of q-probability in the quantum case are formally defined in Subsection 3.4; they
are related to experiment in Subsection 3.5. The final subsection briefly discusses various
examples where probabilistic features emerge from fully determinstic situations – a theme
to be taken up in much more detail in Part III [39].
3.1 Classical probability via expectation
This subsection gives an elementary introduction to classical probability theory along the
lines of Whittle [59], similar in spirit to the formal core of quantum mechanics.
Let Ω denote a finite or infinite set of conceivable experiments ω.11 Let E be a vector
11 In probability theory Ω is called the sample space. In statistics, the ω ∈ Ω may be identified with
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space of real valued functions on Ω containing the constant functions. We identify con-
stant functions with their function values. The elements A ∈ E are called (real) random
variables, and the value A(ω) is called the realization of A in experiment ω. The pro-
cedure that defines how to obtain the realization f(ω) for any experiment ω is called the
protocol defining the random variable f . Functions, order relations, unary and binary
operations, and limits on random variables are defined pointwise; note, however, that a
pointwise function f(A) of a random variable A ∈ E does not necessarily lie in E.
A sample is a finite set S of |S| > 0 experiments; the associated sample mean of a
random variable A is defined by
〈A〉S := 1|S|
∑
ω∈S
A(ω). (17)
It is easily checked that any sample mean 〈·〉 = 〈·〉S satisfies the following rules:
(E1) 〈1〉 = 1.
(E2) 〈αA+ βB〉 = α〈A〉+ β〈B〉 for α, β ∈ R.
(E3) A ≥ 0 implies 〈A〉 ≥ 0.
(E4) A ≥ 0, 〈A〉 = 0 implies A = 0.
(E5) Ak ↓ 0 implies 〈Ak〉 ↓ 0.
Here ↓ denotes pointwise convergence from above. To abstract from a particular sample we
define a stochastic model as an arbitrary mapping that assigns to each random variable
A a real number 〈A〉, called the expectation (or expected value or mean) of A such
that the axioms (E1)–(E5) hold whenever the expectations in question exist. All samples,
arbitrary convex combinations of samples, and their limits, define a stochastic model. Given
real statistical data from real experiments, the quality of a stochastic model is assessed by
how well the expectations of key random variables match corresponding sample expectations
for samples drawn at random in some informal sense.
As a simple consequence of the axioms, we note:
(E6) 〈A2〉 = 0 implies A = 0,
(E7) A ≤ B implies 〈A〉 ≤ 〈B〉.
Indeed, (E6) follows directly from (E4). For (E7), the assumption gives B − A ≥ 0, hence
〈B − A〉 ≥ 0 by (E3), hence 〈B〉 − 〈A〉 ≥ 0 by (E2), giving 〈A〉 ≤ 〈B〉.
An example of a random variable is the number n of eyes on the top side of a die. Here
n(ω) ∈ {1, . . . , 6} is the number of eyes on the die visible in experiment ω. We may thus
consider E to be the algebra generated by a single random variable n = n(ω) taking the
values 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Thus the relevant random variables are the functions A = A(n) defined
by
A(n)(ω) := A(n(ω)).
actual experiments carried out in the past or in the future. In classical statistical mechanics, the ω are only
hypothetical experiments from a fictitious ensemble in the sense of Gibbs, as discussed in Subsection 2.4.
In general, Ω is just a set, and calling the ω ∈ Ω experiments is just a convenient intuition without formal
meaning (comparable to calling elements of a vector space vectors even though they may be functions or
matrices). For examples, see Subsection 3.6.
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A is determined by the vector of the six values A1 = A(1), . . . , A6 = A(6). Therefore we
may identify E with the vector space R6 with componentwise operations. The stochastic
model defined by
〈A〉 := 1
6
(A1 + . . .+ A6)
models an ideal, permutation symmetric die.
In practice the set Ω may be different depending on the imagination of people and the
intended use. The expectation value is independent of ω ∈ Ω and depends – as in the
example just given – on the algebra E of relevant random variables only. This algebra is
always commutative and associative.
A statement is a {0, 1}-valued random variable A. The statement is true (false) in an
experiment ω if A(ω) = 1 (resp. A(ω) = 0). The probability of a statement A, defined as
Pr(A) := 〈A〉
is a number between 0 and 1. Indeed, we have 0 ≤ A ≤ 1. Thus by (E3), 〈A〉 ≥ 0. By (E6)
and (E1), 〈A〉 ≤ 〈1〉 = 1.
Proposition. If A1, . . . , An are alternative statements of which exactly one is true in each
experiment then the probabilities pAi := Pr(Ai) sum up to 1, and Pr(Ai∧Aj) = 0 for i 6= j.
Indeed, the random variable E :=
n∑
i=1
Ai satisfies
χ(ω) =
n∑
i=1
Ai(ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω,
because by definition exactly one Ai occurs in each experiment ω. Therefore E = 1, and
1 = 〈1〉 = 〈E〉 =
〈 n∑
i=1
Ai
〉
=
n∑
i=1
〈Ai〉 =
n∑
i=1
pAi.
Similarly, (Ai ∧Aj)(ω) = Ai(ω)∧Aj(ω) = 0 for i 6= j since at most one of Ai(ω) and Aj(ω)
can be true, hence Ai ∧ Aj = 0 and Pr(Ai ∧Aj) = Pr(0) = 〈0〉 = 0.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable A is the function
cdf : R→ [0, 1] defined by as
cdf(x) := Pr(A ≤ x) = 〈[A ≤ x]〉
for all x. Here [. . .] denotes the statement ({0, 1}-valued function) defined by the formula
inside the square brackets.
Proposition. Every CDF is monotone increasing and satisfies
lim
ε↓0
cdf(x+ ε) = cdf(x), lim
x→−∞
cdf(x) = 0, lim
x→+∞
cdf(x) = 1, (18)
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Thus every CDF is continuous from the right.
Proof. By (E6), x ≤ x′ implies
[A ≤ x′]− [A ≤ x] ≥ 0
so by (E6),
Pr(A ≤ x′)− Pr(A ≤ x) = 〈[A ≤ x′]− [A ≤ x]〉 = 〈[x < A ≤ x′]〉 = Pr([x < A ≤ x′]) ≥ 0.
and thus
cdf(x) ≤ cdf(x′).
To prove continuity from the right we note that the random variable
B(ε) := [x < A ≤ x+ ε]
vanishes at ω with A(ω) ≤ x and for ε < A(ω)−x if A(ω) > x, and is 1 otherwise. Therefore
B(ε) ↓ 0 for ε ↓ 0. Thus
〈B(ε)〉 ↓ 0 for ε ↓ 0
by (E5). But
〈B(ε)〉 = Pr(x < A ≤ x+ ε) = cdf(x+ ε)− cdf(x),
hence the first limit of (18) follows. The other limits are proved in the same way. ⊓⊔
Let A be a random variable with CDF cdf. If f is a step function with finitely many jump
points at x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn and f is continuous from the left then
〈f(A)〉 = f(x1)cdf(x1) +
n−1∑
k=1
f(xk+1)(cdf(xk+1)− cdf(xk)). (19)
Indeed, the right hand side equals the expectation of
f(x1)[A ≤ x1] + . . .+
∑
f(xk)[xk−1 < A ≤ xk] = f(A).
By taking a continuum limit in (19), we obtain the Stieltjes integral representation
〈f(A)〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(ξ)d cdf(ξ).
for the expectation of f(A), for any function f that is continuous from the left. Thus the
CDF contains all information about expectations of functions of a real random variable.
For a random variable A with continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function,
the distribution or density ρ of A is defined as
ρ(ξ) =
d
dξ
cdf(ξ).
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It is always nonnegative since the CDF is monotone increasing. The CDF can be expressed
in terms of the density as
cdf(ξ) =
∫ ξ
−∞
ρ(ζ)dζ
If the density ρ(x) exists, it also carries all information about expectations of functions of
A. Indeed, we have
〈f(A)〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(ξ)ρ(ξ)dξ
since d cdf(ξ) = ρ(ξ)dξ.
3.2 Description dependence of probabilities
Classical probabilities are dependent on the description used. The latter encode the assumed
knowledge about the system under study. Note that the implied concept of knowledge is
not the knowledge of a particular observer or person but an informal shorthand for what
is modeled in a particular description. Thus the ’knowledge available’, i.e., the knowledge
encoded into a particular description, is an objective property of the description used to
model the system, independent of who ’knows’ or ’uses’ it. Nothing mental is implied. A
change of knowledge is therefore just a change of the model used to describe a particular
system.
Sample expectations and hence sample probabilities have a clear operational meaning. But
they are properties of the specific sample taken – changing the sample, e.g., when the values
for new realizations become known, almost always changes the values of sample expectations
and sample probabilities.
Cumulative distribution functions are easy to estimate on a sample S by the sample CDF
cdfS(ξ) =
number of ω ∈ S with x(ω) ≤ ξ
|S| ,
corresponding to the sample expectation (17). A sample CDF is always a step function
with discontinuities at the x(ω) with ω ∈ S. In many cases it is well approximated by a
smoothed CDF, using one of many smoothing methods available. The derivative of the
smoothed CDF then serves as an estimate for the density of a random variable A in a
stochastic model in which A is treated as a random variable with density.
In the univariate case treated above in detail, going from a known sample to predictions for
not yet known samples is based on the possibility to approximate sample distributions of
different sample sizes by a single model distribution since their CDFs are very similar. This
also holds in the multivariate case, though different techniques must be used to establish
corresponding results. Finite sample properties can be proved using arguments basically
similar to our proof of the weak law of large numbers (24); under reasoable assumptions,
the uncertainty of the most relevant random variables scales again with O(N−1/2). This is
the contents of large N approximations that take the form of laws of large numbers and
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central limit theorems. They guarantee enhanced predictability of the kind that the mean
uncertainty is approximately the single case uncertainty divided by
√
N .
Thus the precise meaning of expectations and probabilities depends on which stochastic
model is used for a given situation. To see what happens when we change the description
we consider the concept of conditional expectation, which models the reweighing of evidence
leading to a change of the description of a model. A weight is a nonzero random variable
P ≥ 0. Let
ΩP = {ω ∈ Ω | P (ω) > 0}
We project the algebra E of random variables X : Ω → R to an algebra EP of random
variables Y : ΩP → R by means of the homomorphism
·|ΩP : E→ EP : X 7→ X|ΩP
that restricts all random variables X ∈ E to X|ΩP ∈ ΩP . The conditional expectation
of X : Ω→ R with respect to the weight P is defined as
〈X|ΩP 〉P = 〈X〉P :=
〈X · P 〉
〈P 〉 ;
note that 〈P 〉 > 0 by (E4). The resulting mapping 〈·〉P : EP → R satisfies all expectation
axioms: (E1)–(E3) and (E5) follow directly from the corresponding axioms for 〈·〉. Only
(E4) is nontrivial; 〈X2〉P = 0 implies 〈X2P 〉 = 〈P 〉〈X2〉P = 0. But X2P ≥ 0, hence (E4)
gives X2P = 0, i.e., X(ω)2P (ω) = 0 for all ω. Thus X(ω) = 0 whenever P (ω) = 1. This
gives X|ΩP = 0 and proves (E4). Therefore 〈·〉P is a proper expectation for the experiments
in ΩP .
In particular, any statement A with positive probability Pr(A) > 0 may be considered as a
weight. Since ΩA is the set of all those experiments where A is true, conditional expectation
with respect to A is just expectation in the light of the assumed evidence that A is true. In
particular, the probability for A being true changed to 1. More generally, the conditional
probability of a statement B given the statement A is defined by
Pr(B|A) := 〈B〉A = 〈BA〉〈A〉 =
Pr(A ∧B)
Pr(A)
;
the last equality holds since
BA(ω) = B(ω)A(ω) =
{
1 iff A(ω) ∧ B(ω),
0 otherwise.
It is easily checked that for any statements A and B we have
Pr(B ∧ A) = Pr(B|A) Pr(A), (20)
Pr(A|B) = Pr(A)Pr(B|A)
Pr(B)
. (21)
(21) is often called the Bayes theorem. In this context, Pr(A) is called the prior proba-
bility of A, Pr(A|B) its posterior probability, and Pr(B|A)/Pr(B) the update ratio. If
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A and B are independent then 〈AB〉 = 〈A〉〈B〉, hence Pr(B|A)/Pr(B) = 〈AB〉/〈A〉〈B〉 =
1. Thus the update ratio captures the degree to which the knowledge of B affects knowl-
edge of A. Thus, Bayes theorem allows us to describe the change of c-probability of a class
of statements when new information (namely the statement B) arrives and is accepted as
valid. Bayes theorem is important to understand what it means to get new information
when A is a statement of interest and B is information that becomes known. Bayes theorem
tells how the probability of A changes under new insight. Pr(A) changes into Pr(A|B), so
the probability of A must be multiplied by the update ratio Pr(B|A)/Pr(B).
3.3 Deterministic and stochastic aspects
Some people are hoping to reintroduce determinism in some way, perhaps by means of hidden
variables or something like that, but it just doesn’t work according to the accepted ideas. I might
add that personally I still have this prejudice against indeterminacy in basic physics. I have
to accept it because we cannot do anything better at the present time. It may be that in some
future development we shall be able to return to determinism, but only at the expense of giving
up something else, some other prejudice which we hold to very strongly at the present time.
Paul Dirac, 1972 [12, p.7]
The Ehrenfest picture shows that the q-expectations behave like classical variables and are
governed by a deterministic, Hamiltonian dynamics. Thus in the thermal interpretation,
quantum physics is a deterministic theory.
Various theorems (beginning with Bell [3]) and associated experiments (beginning with
Aspect [2]) exclude the existence of certain kinds of deterministic theories explaining
quantum mechanics through hidden variables that assume some form of locality, noncon-
textuality, or sharpness; cf. Subsection 4.5. Since the deterministic Ehrenfest dynamics
for q-expectations follows from the Schro¨dinger equation, there can be no conflict with
such no-go theorems for deterministic dynamics. Indeed, most q-expectations, for example
those of momentum or kinetic energy, are nonlocal objects, and sharpness is in the thermal
interpretation denied from the start. The germ of the new interpretation was actually my
analysis in [32] of sharpness arguments in a number of no-go theorems.
A quantity A is considered to be significant if σA ≪ |A|, while it is considered as noise
if σA ≫ |A|. If A is a quantity and A˜ is a good numerical approximation of its value then
∆A := A − A˜ is noise. Sufficiently significant quantities can be treated as deterministic;
the analysis of noise is the subject of statistics.
Statistics is based on the idea of obtaining information about noisy quantities of a system by
repeated sampling from a population of independent systems with identical preparation,
but differing in noisy details not controllable by the preparation. In the present context,
such systems are described by the same Hilbert space, the same set of quantities to be
sampled, and the same state 〈·〉0. The quantities therefore belong to the algebra LinHS of
linear operators on a Euclidean space HS dense in the Hilbert space of the system.
More precisely, stochastic features emerge when we consider a large sample of similar sub-
systems of a quantum system. For an ensemble of independent measurements on identi-
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cally prepared systems, the consensus of all interpretations is that q-expectations represent
(within the accuracy allowed by the law of large numbers) a statistical average of the mea-
surement results.12 In order that the thermal interpretation is viable we must therefore
be able to show that the q-variance is indeed a statistical property of many independent
measurements on identically prepared systems.
We regard the systems of the population considered as subsystems of a bigger system (e.g.,
the laboratory) whose set of quantities is given by the algebra LinH of linear operators on
a big Euclidean space H dense in the Hilbert space of the big system. To model identically
prepared subsystems we consider injective homomorphisms from LinHS into LinHmapping
each reference quantity A ∈ LinHS to the quantity Al ∈ LinH of the lth subsystem
considered to be ‘identical’ with A. Of course, in terms of the big system, the Al are not
really identical; they refer to quantities distinguished by position and/or time. That the
subsystems are identically prepared is instead modeled by the assumption
〈Ak〉 = 〈Al〉 for all k 6= l, (22)
and that they are independent by the assumption
〈AkAl〉 = 〈Ak〉〈Al〉 for all k 6= l. (23)
The following result is fundamental for statistical considerations:
Theorem (Weak law of large numbers). For a sample of quantities Al (l = 1, . . . , N)
satisfying (22) and (23), the mean quantity
Â :=
1
N
N∑
l=1
Al
(which again is a quantity) satisfies for any l
〈Â〉 = 〈Al〉, σÂ = σAl/
√
N. (24)
Proof. By (22) and (23), µ := 〈Al〉 and σ := σAl are independent of l, and we have
〈Â〉 = 1
N
(〈A1〉+ . . .+ 〈AN〉) = 1
N
(µ+ . . .+ µ) = µ,
〈Â ∗Â 〉 = 1
N2
〈(∑
j
Aj
)∗(∑
k
Ak
)〉
= N−2
∑
j,k
〈A∗jAk〉. (25)
12 In order to take the q-variance alternatively as a time average of a single system, one would need to
invoke an ergodic theorem stating that the time average equals the ensemble average. However such an
ergodic theorem makes sense only semiclassically, and is valid only for very simple classical systems. Most
deterministic systems are far from ergodic. (This is mentioned, e.g., in the statistical physics book by Lan-
dau & Lifschitz [29, Footnote 2, p.12].) From the eight examples of statistical models for deterministic
systems given in Subsection 3.6 below, only two – cases (vi) and (vii) – have a generally valid ensemble
interpretation in terms of ergodicity! Thus the interpretation of the q-variance as a time average is usually
not warranted. This also means (Neumaier [36]) that – in contrast to what is usually done in the popular
literature – the so-called vacuum fluctuations cannot be interpreted as fluctuations in time.
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Now
〈A∗jAj〉 = 〈Aj〉∗〈Aj〉+ σ2Aj = |µ|2 + σ2,
and by (23) for j 6= k,
〈A∗jAk + A∗kAj〉 = 2Re〈A∗jAk〉 = 2Re〈Aj〉∗〈Ak〉 = 2Reµ∗µ = 2|µ|2.
In the sum in (25), this leads to a contribution of |µ|2 + σ2 for each of the N diagonal
elements, and of 2|µ|2 for each of the (N
2
)
pairs of off-diagonal elements. Therefore
〈Â ∗Â 〉 = N−2
(
N(|µ|2 + σ2) +
(
N
2
)
2|µ|2
)
= N−1σ2 + |µ|2,
so that
σ2
Â
= 〈Â ∗Â 〉 − 〈Â 〉∗〈Â 〉 = N−1σ2,
and the assertions follow. ⊓⊔
As a significant body of work in probability theory shows, the conditions under which
σÂ → 0 as N →∞ can be significantly relaxed; thus in practice, it is sufficient if (22) and
(23) are approximately valid.
The significance of the weak law of large numbers lies in the fact that (24) becomes ar-
bitrarily small as N becomes sufficiently large. Thus the uncertainty of quantities when
averaged over a large population of identically prepared systems becomes arbitrarily small
while the mean value reproduces the value of each quantity.
The weak law of large numbers implies that, in a context where many repeated experiments
are feasible, states can be given a frequentist interpretation, in which A = 〈A〉 is the
expectation of A, empirically defined as an average over many realizations. In this case
(and only in this case), the uncertainty σA becomes the standard deviation of A; then it
captures the absolute accuracy of the individual realizations.
Note that there are also many single systems with a sound statistical interpretation. Once
one has a time series of a single system that empirically looks fluctuating, one can do
valid statistics with it. Sun spot activity data or El Nino data (both time series for single
physical systems) are traditional test data for statistical procedures. Single deterministic
systems data with highly oscillating contributions – like the weather on Earth – are routinely
explained and forecast in terms of a stochastic process. Thus, whenever the statistics of
interest is that of a system’s mean behavior in time (or in space), it is meaningful to do
statistics on the single system. The time (or space) coordinates then label the sample under
consideration. (See Footnote 12 for the related notion of ergodicity.)
On the other hand, in equilibrium thermodynamics, where a tiny number of macroscopic
observations on a single system completely determine its state to engineering accuracy, such
a frequentist interpretation is inappropriate.
Thus, the thermal interpretation captures correctly the experimental practice, and deter-
mines the conditions under which deterministic and statistical reasoning are justified:
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(SP) Statistical principle: Deterministic reasoning is appropriate for all sufficiently
significant quantities. Statistical reasoning is necessary for noisy quantities, and requires
that these quantities are sufficiently similar and sufficiently independent to ensure that their
mean is significant.
In this way, statistical considerations naturally arise from the nonstatistical foundations,
giving statistics the same role as in classical physics, namely as the art and science of
interpreting measurements. Real experiments are (and must be) designed such that they
allow one to determine approximately the relevant properties of the state under study,
hence the values of all quantities of interest. The uncertainties in the experiments imply
approximations, which, if treated probabilistically, need an additional probabilistic layer.
Expectations from this secondary layer, which involve probabilistic statements about situ-
ations that are uncertain due to neglected but in principle observable details (cf. Peres
[46]), happen to have the same formal properties as the values on the primary layer, though
their physical origin and meaning is completely different.
3.4 What is probability?
In Subsection 3.1, we derived from (E1)–(E5) the traditional probabilistic machinery for
single real random variables. More generally, it can be proved (see Whittle [59]) that
even in the multivariate case, the above approach to classical probability is equivalent to the
measure theoretical approach in the traditional axiomatic setting of Kolmogorov. In this
equivalence, Ω is an abstract measure space, a stochastic model is a probability measure
on Ω, and E is a vector space of random variables with finite expectation.
The exposition in Whittle [59] (or, in more abstract terms, already in Gelfand &
Naimark [15]) shows that, if the Xj are pairwise commuting, it is possible to define for
any Gibbs state in the present sense, random variables Xj in Kolmogorov’s sense such that
the expectation of all sufficiently regular functions f(X) defined on the joint spectrum of
X agrees with the value of f . It follows that in the pairwise commuting case, it is always
possible to construct a probability interpretation for the quantities, completely independent
of any assumed microscopic reality. (If the components ofX do not commute, a probabilistic
interpretation in the Kolmogorov sense is no longer possible because of the nonclassical
uncertainty relations (16).)
The details (which the reader unfamiliar with measure theory may simply skip) are as
follows. We may associate with every vector X of quantities with commuting components
a time-dependent, monotone linear functional 〈·〉t defining the expectation
〈f(X)〉t := Tr ρ(t)f(X)
at time t of arbitrary bounded continuous functions f of X . These functions define a com-
mutative C∗-algebra E(X). The spectrum SpecX of X is the set of all ∗-homomorphisms
(called characters) from E(X) to C, and has the structure of a Hausdorff space, with the
weak-∗ topology obtained by calling a subset S of SpecX closed if, for any pointwise
convergent sequence (or net) contained in S, its limit is also in S. Now an expectation
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functional satisfying (E1)–(E5) turns out to be equivalent to a multivariate probability
measure dµt(X) (on the sigma algebra of Borel subsets of the spectrum Ω of X) defined by∫
dµt(X)f(X) :=
∫
ρ(t)f(X) = 〈f(X)〉t.
Both Whittle’s and Kolmogorov’s foundation of classical probability theory are axiomatic
and hence independent of the interpretation of the axioms. We may refer to probability as
defined by Kolmogorov or Whittle as c-probability.
In generalization of this, we refer, for any Hermitian operators P satisfying 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, to
its expectation as the q-probability
Pr(P ) := 〈P 〉
of P . As a special case, we call a quantity P satisfying P 2 = P = P ∗ a statement; then
0 ≤ P ≤ 1 follows by the spectreal theorem. For a statement P , the uncertainty of its
probability p = P is σP =
√
p(1− p) since by (15), σ2P = 〈P 2〉 − P
2
= p − p2. Another
special case is the q-probability of a self-adjoint Hermitian q-observable A taking values in
some open interval ]a, b[ of real numbers, defined as
Pr(A ∈ ]a, b[) := 〈P]a,b[(A)〉,
where P = P]a,b[(A) is the spectral projector of A to the interval ]a, b[. Note that here
P 2 = P = P ∗, so that P is a statement – the formal equivalent of the informal statement
’A is in ]a, b[’.
Whittle’s approach is essentially equivalent to the commutative case of the formal core of
quantum mechanics, interpreted in statistical terms. Then q-probabilities and c-probabili-
ties agree.
We discuss in more detail the important special case of binary tests, where Born’s rule
frequently applies essentially exactly. An ideal binary measurement, e.g., the click of a
detector, is described by a statement P coding the presence (1) or absence (0) of a click.
In particular, a test for a state13 φ with φ∗φ = 1 is an ideal binary measurement of
P = φφ∗; it is easily checked that this is a statement. By the above, such a test turns out
positive with probability p = 〈P 〉. In particular, if the system is in a pure state ψ then
p = 〈P 〉 = ψ∗Pψ = ψ∗φφ∗ψ = |φ∗ψ|2, hence
p = |φ∗ψ|2.
This is the well-known squared probability amplitude formula appearing in the scat-
tering form of Born’s rule as stated in Part I [38, Subsection 3.1]. Thus the scattering form
of Born’s rule appears as natural consequence rather than as a basic axiom.
13 Note that a test for φ turns out positively with probability 1 if the measured system is in the pure
state φ. However, it also turns out positively with a positive probability if the measured system is in a
pure state different from φ, as long as it is not orthogonal to it. Thus calling it a ’test for φ’, though
conventional, is something of a misnomer.
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3.5 Probability measurements
When it uses probabilities, [...] science regards them [...] as measurable
(and calculable) physical quantities like lengths, energies, and wave-
lengths. [...] The probability of a truly single event is intrinsically
unmeasurable and [...] science has nothing to say about” it. ”To ob-
tain the value of a physical quantity, one must measure it a number
of times, Each measurement contains an error, and the ’true’ value is
(usually) computed as the arithmetic mean of all measured values. [...]
in a similar way”, we ”measure the relative frequency [...] of an event
in a series of trials. Each relative frequency contains an error, and the
’true’ probability is computed as the mean of the relative frequencies
over a number of series. [...] nothing strange or inconsistent is left in
the idea of probability as a measurable physical quantity.
Henry Margenau, 1950 [30, pp.250–252]
By its definition, the notions of q-expectations and q-probabilities belong to the formal
core of quantum mechanics and are independent of any interpretation. But in the thermal
interpretation all q-expectations, and in particular all q-probabilities, are among the be-
ables. We discuss here basic aspects of their measurement; a more thorough discussion of
measurement from the point of view of the thermal interpretation is given in Part III [39].
By the law of large numbers, q-expectations can be measured with in principle arbitrarily
high accuracy by taking sample means of low accuracy measurements, whenever there is a
device (the preparation) – e.g., a particle accelerator – that produces a large number of
independent copies (realizations) of the same quantum system. The accuracy improves by
a factor of
√
N , where N is the sample size.
In the same way, the q-probability p are approximately measurable as relative frequencies.
As a consequence of the weak law of large numbers (24), the uncertainty of the relative
frequency pN , defined as the sample mean of ideal binary measurements in a sample of
N independent realizations of the statement P , is σ = σP
√
N = /
√
p(1− p)/N . This
uncertainty approaches zero when the sample size N gets arbitrarily large. Thus measuring
a probability by a relative frequency gives in principle arbitrarily accurate results.
This gives a fully adequate operational definition of probabilities without any logical prob-
lems, of the same quality as operational definitions of highly accurate length or time mea-
surements: The q-probabilities are theoretical observables; they are measured as relative
frequencies, to some reasonable accuracy that can be quantified by the associated un-
certainty. We draw conclusions about sufficiently uncertain situations based on observed
sample means and relative frequencies on a sample of significant size, and we quantify our
remaining uncertainty by statistical safeguards (confidence intervals, etc.), well knowing
that these sometimes fail. For example, the 5σ-rule for the discovery of elementary parti-
cles tries to guard against such failures. This view of probabilities as measurable entities is
just the one described in the above quote by Margenau (if ’final’ is read for ’true’).
Thus probability has an objective interpretation precisely to the extent that objective pro-
tocols for taking the sample measurements i.e., how to distinguish a positive from a negative
test, are agreed upon. Any subjectivity remaining lies in the question of deciding which
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protocol should be used for accepting a measurement as ’correct’. Different protocols may
give different results. Both classically and quantum mechanically, the experimental context
needed to define the protocol influences the outcome. In particular, there is a big differ-
ence between the description of an event before (predicting) or after (analyzing) it occurs.
This is captured rigorously in classical probability theory by conditional probabilities (cf.
Subsection 3.2), and less rigorously in quantum physics by the so-called collapse of the
wave function, where the description of the state of a particle is different before and after it
passes a filter (polarizer, magnet, double slit, etc.). Thus we may view the collapse as the
quantum analogue of the change of conditional probability when the context changes due
to new information. Recognizing this removes another piece of strangeness from quantum
physics.
3.6 The stochastic description of a deterministic system
A stochastic description of a deterministic system is a reduced deterministic description
by moments rather than details. Formally, it is obtained by restricting an algebra of com-
muting, classical quantities describing a given deterministic system to the subalgebra of
quantities completely symmetric in some properties declared indistinguishable for the
purposes of the reduced (or coarse-grained) description. In the simplest case, where expec-
tation is defined as sample expectation, the individual realizations over which the sample
mean is taken are declared indistinguishable, with the consequence that only symmetric
functions of relatizations – hence functions of expectations – are available in the reduced
descriptions.
In the terminology of knowledge discussed in Subsection 3.2, such a reduction amounts to
forgetting or ignoring information known from the more detailed model. We have additional
modeling uncertainty due to the lack of detail in the description used. This description is
independent of a probabilistic interpretation.14 It just means that one only considers a
limited family of well-behaved relevant quantities in place of the multitude of quantities in
a more detailed description.
The analysis presentented here allows one to apply statistical models to complicated de-
terministic situations – not only in physics – and to single complicated spatial events or
time series. In each case, a suitable concept of expectation is introduced that, as a figure of
speech, allows one to make probabilistic and other statistical statements about deterministic
situations.
Important examples of statistical models for deterministic situations with increasingly ran-
dom appearance are:
(i) The deterministic but irregular sequence of prime numbers (Tennenbaum [55]). Here
experiments are the natural numbers, and expectations are introduced through a mathe-
matically rigorous limit.
14 though via the construction of Subsection 3.4 below, it can always be given one in terms of c-
probabilities
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(ii) Rounding errors in deterministic floating-point computations (Vignes [56]). Here
experiments are sequences of floating-point operations, and expectations are introduced
through an empirical model for single rounding errors and an assumption of independence.
(iii) Texture in a single (hence fully determined) picture (Heeger & Bergen [20]). Here
experiments are hypothetical images of the same size, and expectations are introduced
through a mean over a (not well-defined) neighborhood of pixels.
(iv) Economic time series, e.g., prices of oil and electricity (Granger & Newbold [18]).
Here experiments are hypothetical scenarios for the time series, and expectations are intro-
duced through a no longer fully well-defined time average.
(v) Tomorrow’s weather prediction, when based on classical fluid mechanics (Gneiting &
Raftery [17]). Here experiments are again hypothetical weather scenarios, and expecta-
tions are introduced through an even less well-defined space-time average.
(vi) Deciding for red or black by spinning a roulette wheel (Hopf [25]). Here expectations
may be introduced through symmetry arguments (for an ideal wheel), or through ergodic
theory.
(vii) The classical statistical mechanics of an ideal gas. Here Boltzmann [6] introduced
expectations through an average over all particles.
(viii) The classical statistical mechanics of solids and fluids. Here Gibbs [16] introduced
expectations through a fictitious average over many systems with identical macroscopic
properties.
4 The thermal interpretation of quantum field theory
In the thermal interpretation, the fundamental description of reality is taken to be standard
relativistic quantum field theory.15 On the formal (uninterpreted) level, the formal core of
quantum physics is valid for both quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. But since
the algebra of quantities considered is different, there are two essential differences between
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory:
First, in place of position and momentum of finitely many particles in quantum mechan-
ics one has in quantum field theory operators for fields. Each field φ has a space-time
dependence that satisfy Galilei or Poincare invariance and causal commutation relations.
Thus each field provides an infinitude of uncertain quantitites. More precisely, since from a
rigorous point of view, field operators φ(x, t) at spatial position x and time t are distribution-
valued operators, the quantities in quantum field theory are smeared fields, local space-
time integrals
φ(f) =
∫
Ω
f(x, t)Tφ(x, t)dxdt
15 It does not matter whether or not there is a deeper underlying structure such as that of string theory,
in terms of which quantum field theory would be an effective theory only.
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over local patches Ω in space-time, where f is a smooth test function (e.g., a Gaussian),
and multipoint generalizations of these.
Second, unlike in quantum mechanics, position in quantum field theory is not an opera-
tor but a parameter, hence has no associated uncertainty. The uncertainty is instead in
the quantities described by the details of the test functions f associated with real field
measurements.
In this section we show that these differences strongly affect the relation between quantum
field theory and reality. Among the beables of quantum field theory (discussed in Subsection
4.1) are smeared field expectations and pair correlation functions, which encode most of
what is of experimental relevance in quantum field theory. Subsection 4.2 comments on
relativistic quantum field theory at finite times, a usually much neglected topic essential
for a realistic interpretation of the universe in terms of quantum field theory, given in
Subsection 4.3. Finally we discuss notions of causality (Subsection 4.4) and nonlocality
(Subsection 4.5) and their relation to the thermal interpretation.
4.1 Beables and observability in quantum field theory
The most directly observable (and hence obviously real) features of a macroscopic system
modeled by quantum field theory are the q-expectations of smeared versions of the most
important quantum fields, integrated over cells of macroscopic or mesoscopic size.
This identification can be made because statistical mechanics allows one to derive for the
q-expectations of the fields the equations of state of equilibrium thermodynamics for cells
of macroscopic size in thermal equilibrium and the hydromechanical equations for cells
of mesoscopic size in local equilibrium. Both are known to yield excellent macroscopic
descriptions of matter.
For macroscopic systems, one must necessarily use a coarse-grained description in terms
of a limited number of parameters. In the quantum field theory of macroscopic objects,
any averaging necessary for applying the law of large numbers is already done inside the
definition of the macroscopic (i.e., smeared) operator to be measured. As shown in sta-
tistical mechanics, this is sufficient to guarantee very small uncertainties of macroscopic
q-observables. Thus one does not need an additional averaging in terms of multiple exper-
iments on similarly prepared copies of the system. This is the deeper reason why quantum
field theory can make accurate predictions for single measurements on macroscopic systems.
In addition to the macroscopic ontology just described, the thermal interpretation also has a
microscopic ontology concerning the reality of inferred entities. As in our earlier discussion
of quantum mechanics, the thermal interpretation declares as real but not directly observ-
able any q-expectation 〈A(x, t)〉 of operators and any q-correlation, the q-expectation
of a product of operators at pairwise distinct points. More precisely, the q-expectations
〈φ(x, t)〉 of fields are distributions that produce the – in principle approximately measur-
able – numbers 〈φ(f)〉 when integrated over sufficiently smooth localized test functions f .
Certain q-correlations are also measurable in principle by probing the state with external
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fields in linear or nonlinear response theory. See, e.g., Ha¨nggi & Thomas [19] for classical
correlations and Davies & Spohn [9] for quantum correlations.
Scattering experiments provide further observable information, about time-ordered multi-
point correlations of these fields. The related S-matrices also appear in microlocal kinetic
descriptions of dilute macroscopic matter at the level of the Boltzmann equation or the
Kadanoff–Baym equations. These are derived from the q-expectations of products of fields
at two different space-time points. (The kinetics of the Boltzmann equation derived from
the particle picture has long been replaced by more accurate Kadanoff–Baym equations
derived from field theory.)
2-point correlations in quantum field theory are effectively classical observables; indeed,
in kinetic theory they appear as the classical variables of the Kadanoff-Baym equations,
approximate dynamical equations for the 2-point functions. After a Wigner transform
and some further approximation (averaging over small cells in phase space), these turn
into the classical variables of the Boltzmann equation. After integration over momenta
and some further approximation (averaging over small cells in position space), these turn
into the classical variables of the Navier-Stokes equation, hydromechanic equations that
describe the behavior of macroscopic fluids. For macroscopic solids, one can use similar
approximations to arrive at the equations of elasticity theory. The most detailed classical
level, the Kadanoff-Baym equations, still contain the unsmeared ensemble means of field
products.
According to the thermal interpretation, there is nothing in quantum field theory apart
from q-expectations of the fields and q-correlations. The quantities accessible to an ob-
server are those q-expectations and q-correlations whose arguments are restricted to the
observer’s world tube. More precisely, what we can observe is contained in the least oscil-
lating contributions to these q-expectations and q-correlations. The spatial and temporal
high frequency part is unobservable due to the limited resolution of our instruments.
All macroscopic objects are objects describable by hydromechanics and elasticity theory;
so their classical variables have the same interpretation. Thus the quantum-mechanical
ensemble averages are classical variables. Moreover, because of the law of large numbers,
〈f(x)〉 ≈ f(〈x〉) for any sufficiently smooth function f of not too many variables. (These
caveats are needed because high dimensions and highly nonlinear functions do not behave
so well under the law of large numbers.) In particular, we get from Ehrenfest’s theorem (8)
the standard classical Hamiltonian equations of motion for macroscopic objects.
Statistical mechanics shows that the uncertainties in the macroscopically relevant smeared
fields scale with the inverse square root of the cell volume. This means that integrals over
〈Φ(x, t)〉 are macroscopically meaningful only to an accuracy of order V −1/2 where V is
the volume occupied by the mesoscopic cell containing x, assumed to be homogeneous and
in local equilibrium. This is the standard assumption for deriving from first principles
hydrodynamical equations and the like. It means that the interpretation of a field gets
more fuzzy as one reduces the amount of coarse graining – until at some point the local
equilibrium hypothesis is no longer valid.
Everything deduced in quantum field theory about macroscopic properties of matter in
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local equilibrium or dilute matter in the kinetic regime follows, and one has a completely
self-consistent setting. The transition to classicality is automatic and needs no deep investi-
gations: The classical situation is simply the limit of a huge number of particles, where the
law of large numbers discussed in Subsection 3.3 reduces the uncertainty to a level below
measurement accuracy.
Since quantum fields are quantities depending on a space-time argument, one can prepare
or measure events at any particular space-time position at most once. Thus it is impossible
to repeat measurements, and the standard statistical interpretation in terms of sufficiently
many identically prepared systems is impossible. Therefore, the notion of ensemble cannot
be understood as an actual repetition by repeated preparation.
In particular, the measurement of quantum fields is not covered by Born’s rule in its stan-
dard measurement-based form. This is the reason why (unlike scattering applications)
macroscopic applications of quantum field theory never invoke Born’s rule. Indeed, we had
concluded in Part I [38] that at finite times (i.e., outside its use in interpreting asymptotic
S-matrix elements), Born’s rule cannot be strictly true in relativistic quantum field theory,
and hence not in nature.
4.2 Dynamics in quantum field theory
The description of dynamics in current relativistic quantum field theory textbooks is a
delicate subject. In many such books, physical meaning is given only to scattering processes,
i.e., the behavior at asymptotic times t→ ±∞, whose statistical properties are expressed in
terms of time-ordered correlation functions. Textbooks commonly restrict their attention
to the calculation of the low order contributions to the scattering amplitudes and how
these are renormalized to give finite results. Questions about the quantum field dynamics
at finite times are not discussed since the dynamics is deeply buried under the formal
difficulties of the renormalization process needed to make relativistic quantum field theory
work. Sometimes they are even claimed to be impossible to address!16 However, on the
level of rigor customary in theoretical physics, quantum field dynamics at finite time is
actually well-defined in terms of the so-called closed time path (CTP) approach; see, e.g.,
Calzetta & Hu [8].
Since the traditional Schro¨dinger picture breaks manifest Poincare´ invariance, relativistic
QFT is almost always treated in the Heisenberg picture. The Heisenberg dynamics on the
fields is given by
∂
∂xν
φ(x) = pν ∠φ(x),
16 For example, Scharf [51, introduction to Chapter 2] writes: ”The more one thinks about this situation,
the more one is led to the conclusion that one should not insist on a detailed description of the system
in time. From the physical point of view, this is not so surprising, because in contrast to non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, the time behavior of a relativistic system with creation and annihilation of particles
is unobservable. Essentially only scattering experiments are possible, therefore we retreat to scattering
theory. One learns modesty in field theory.”
33
where pν is the νth operator component of the 4-momentum vector p, defined as the
generator of the translations of the Poincare´ group. In particular, the physical Hamiltonian
H = cp0, where c is the speed of light, is obtained after the construction of the N -point
functions (q-expectations of fields and q-correlations) as the operator generating the time
shift of the fields.
In the context of the thermal interpretation, a natural covariant generalization of the Ehren-
fest equation (8) is obtained by considering, in place of the time-dependent q-expectations
in the nonrelativistic setting discussed before, q-expectations dependent on a space-time
location x in Minkowkski space, and to require that the resulting space-time dependent
q-expectations 〈A〉x satisfy the covariant Ehrenfest equation
∂
∂xν
〈A〉x = 〈pν ∠A〉x. (26)
One easily concludes that for arbitrary space-time points x, y, z, w, . . .,
〈φ(z)〉x = 〈φ(z + x− y)〉y,
generalizing the nonrelativistic (10), and
〈φ(z)φ(w) · · ·〉x = 〈φ(z + x− y)φ(w + x− y) · · ·〉y.
Thus the complete spacetime-dependence of q-expectations, and in particular their dynam-
ics, is determined by the q-expectations at any particular fixed space-time position.
From the covariant Ehrenfest picture we may now deduce a covariant Schro¨dinger pic-
ture, by writing
〈A〉x := Tr ρ(x)A
with a space-time dependent density operator ρ. Then (26) becomes the covariant von
Neumann equation
ih¯
∂
∂xν
ρ(x) = [pν , ρ(x)].
The rank is preserved. Hence if ρ has rank 1, this is equivalent with writing ρ(x) =
ψ(x)ψ(x)∗, where ψ(x) satisfies the covariant Schro¨dinge equation
ih¯
∂
∂xν
ψ(x) = pνψ(x).
After rescaling, we see that in quantum field theory, time tν = xν/c and energy Hν = cpν
– not space and momentum – have become 4-dimensional:
ih¯
∂
∂tν
ψ(x) = Hνψ(x).
4.3 The universe as a quantum system
Our solar system can be approximately treated classically, but from the fundamental point
of view of quantum field theory it must be considered as a quantum system. The state of
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the solar system, when modeled by quantum fields, completely specifies what happens in
any small space-time region within the solar system.
Traditional interpretations of Copenhagen flavor require that a quantum system is measured
by an external classical apparatus. They cannot apply to the quantum field theory of
our solar system, say, since we do not have access to an external classical apparatus for
measuring this system. The astronomers doing measurements on the solar system are
part of the system measured – a situation outside the Copenhagen setting. The thermal
interpretation has no such problems.
The thermal interpretation is even consistent with assigning a well-defined (though only
superficially known) state to the whole universe, whose properties account for everything
observable within this universe.
Unlike in conventional single-world interpretations of quantum physics, nothing in the ther-
mal interpretation depends on the existence of measurement devices (which were not avail-
able in the very far past of the universe). Thus the thermal interpretation allows one to
consider the single universe we live in as a quantum system, the smallest closed physical
system containing us, hence strictly speaking the only system to which unitary quantum
physics applies rigorously.
There is no longer a physical reason to question the existence of the state of the whole
universe, even though all its details may be unknown for ever. Measuring all q-observables
or finding its exact state is already out of the question for a small macroscopic quantum
system such as a piece of metal. Thus, as for a metal, one must be content with describing
the state of the universe approximately.
What matters for a successful physics of the universe is only that we can model (and
then predict) those q-observables of the universe that are accessible to measurement at the
temporal and spatial scales of human beings. Since all quantities of interest in a study of the
universe as a whole are macroscopic, they have a tiny uncertainty and are well-determined
even by an approximate state. For example, one could compute from a proposed model
of the universe the uncertain values of the electromagnetic field at points where we can
measure it, and (if the computations could be done) should get excellent agreement with
the measurements.
Since every q-observable of a subsystem is also a q-observable of the whole system, the state
of the universe must be compatible with everything we have ever empirically observed in
the universe. This implies that the state of the universe is highly constrained since knowing
this state amounts to having represented all physics accessible to us by the study of its
subsystems. This constitutes a very stringent test of adequacy of a putative state of the
universe.
Cosmology studies the state of the universe in a very coarse (and partly conjectured) approx-
imation where even details at the level of galaxies are averaged over. Only for q-observables
localized in the solar system we have a much more detailed knowledge.
Of course, a more detailed discussion of the state of the universe should include gravitation
and hence would touch on the difficult, unsolved problem of quantum gravity. However,
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the thermal interpretation gives at least a consistent interpretational framework in which
to discuss these questions - without having to worry about whether the concepts used
to formulate these questions mean anything in the context of a quantum system without
external observers.
In relativistic quantum field theory, the basic fields are local objects in the sense that
smeared fields φ(f) and φ(g) commute whenever f and g have spacelike separated support.
Nevertheless, a quantum state specifies the q-expectations 〈φ(f)〉 for arbitrary smooth test
functions f and the higher order moments (n-point correlation functions) 〈φ(f1) . . . 〈φ(fn)〉
for arbitrary smooth test functions f1, . . . , fn, hence makes statements about uncertain val-
ues at all space-time locations. Hence relativistic quantum field theory necessarily describes
a complete universe. When gravitation is not modeled, everything happens in a Minkowski
spacetime.
4.4 Relativistic causality
Phrases often found in the physical literature as ’disturbance of phe-
nomena by observation’ or ’creation of physical attributes of objects by
measurements’ represent a use of words like ’phenomena’ and ’obser-
vation’ as well as ’attribute’ and ’measurement’ which is hardly com-
patible with common usage and practical definition and, therefore, is
apt to cause confusion. As a more appropriate way of expression, one
may strongly advocate limitation of the use of the word phenomenon to
refer exclusively to observations obtained under specified circumstances,
including an account of the whole experiment.
Niels Bohr, 1948 [5]
In each experiment, irrespective of its history, there is only one quan-
tum system, which may consist of several particles or other subsystems,
created or annihilated at the various interventions.
Asher Peres and Daniel Terno, 2002 [47, p.98]:
We now consider relativistic causality in a Minkowski spacetime. By working with charts,
everything said generalizes to the case of curved spacetime. Quantized spacetime is not
discussed since there is no accepted framework for it.
A point object has, at any given time in any observer’s frame, properties only at a
single point, namely the point in the intersection of its world line and the spacelike hyper-
plane orthogonal to the observer’s 4-momentum at the time (in the observer frame) under
discussion. An extended object has properties that depend on more than one spacelike-
separated space-time position. A joint property is a property that explicitly depends on
more than one space-time location within the space-time region swept out by the extended
object in the course of time.
Note that from a fundamental point of view there is no clear demarcation line that would
tell when a system of particles (e.g., a molecule, or a sollar system) should or should
not be regarded as a single object. The thermal interpretation therefore treats arbitrary
subsystems of a large system as a single object if they behave in some respect like a unity.
36
We may distinguish three Poincare´ invariant definitions of causality.
• Point causality: Properties of a point object depend only on its closed past cones, and
can influence only its closed future cones. This is used in special relativity, which discusses
the motion of a single classical particle in a classical external field.
• Separable causality: Joint properties of an extended object consist of the combination
of properties of their constituent points. This is intuitively assumed in all discussions of
Bell-type nonlocality, and is in conflict with experiments involving highly entangled photons.
• Extended causality: Joint properties of an extended object depend only on the union
of the closed past cones of their constituent parts, and can influence only the union of the
closed future cones of their constituent parts. This is the version that can probably be
derived from relativistic quantum field theory, where particles are localized excitations of
the quantum field, and hence extended objects.
All three notions of causality agree on the causality properties of point objects (’point
causality’) but differ on the causality properties of extended objects. If one regards an en-
tangled quantum system as a system of point particles one runs into lots of counterintuitive
conceptual problems. If one regards an entangled quantum system as a single extended
system in the above sense, all such difficulties disappear.
Extended causality is the form of causality appropriate for the thermal interpretation. It
takes into account what was known almost from the outset of modern quantum physics -
that quantum objects are intrinsically extended and must be treated as whole.
The extended system view gives the appropriate intuition. The violation of Bell inequalities
in experiments such as those by Aspect [2] (cf. Subsection 4.5) show that neither point
causality or separable causality can be realized in nature. But extended causality is not
ruled out by current experiments. Eberhard & Ross [13] gives a proof of causality from
relativistic quantum field theory, in the sense that no faster than light communication is
possible.
4.5 Nonlocal correlations and conditional information
Bell’s theorem, together with experiments that prove that Bell inequalities are violated
imply that reality modeled by deterministic process variables is intrinsically nonlocal. The
thermal interpretation explicitly acknowledges that all quantum objects (systems and sub-
systems) have an uncertain, not sharply definable (and sometimes extremely extended)
position, hence are intrinsically nonlocal. Thus it violates the assumptions of Bell’s theo-
rem and its variations.
Here we briefly discuss some related aspects of nonlocality from the point of view of the
thermal interpretation.
We use the example of an entangled 2-photon state. In quantum physics, there is a definite
concept of a system in a 2-photon state, but only a fuzzy one of ’two photons’. Attempting
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to literally interpret the two photons in a system with an entangled 2-photon state leads
to paradoxes related to seemingly acausal nonlocal correlations.
Given the quantum mechanical 2-photon system together with the Schro¨dinger dynamics
determined by the associated dispersion relation, Born’s rule makes assertions about mea-
surements anywhere in the universe at any future time! Something more nonlocal cannot be
conceived. It is therefore no surprise that intuition is violated. However, the thermal inter-
pretation renounces the universal validity of Born’s rule. Instead, the nonlocal correlations
get their natural explanation in terms of extended causality and conditional information.
Consider the conceptual setting of a typical Bell-type experiment, where entangled 2-photon
systems are subjected to measurements by two far away observers conventionally called
Alice and Bob, at times and positions corresponding to spacelike distances. Their measure-
ment results are later compared by another observer called Charles, say.
In an experiment checking Bell inequalities, an object in the form of a 2-photon system
may be prepared at the source by parametric down-conversion and propagating freely in
two opposite directions. Whatever Alice and Bob measure far away depends on the whole
2-photon system. According to the thermal interpretation, the object described by this
2-photon system is an extended object. Over long distances, the uncertainty intrinsic to
the 2-photon system becomes huge. The object becomes vastly extended – so nonlocal that
the assumptions in Bell’s argument are obviously violated. It is not surprising that the
conclusions can be violated, too.
Any meaningful use of the notion of causality depends on a notion of before and after,
which does not exist in the case of correlations at spacelike distances. Because of the Lorentz
invariance of all relativistic arguments, one cannot say that Alice’s actions and observations
cause (or affect) Bob’s observations to be correlated once – as usually assumed – Alice’s and
Bob’s position are causally unrelated. For in this case, there are always Lorentz frames in
which Alice acts later than Bob observes, and others in which Bob acts later than Alice. So
neither can be said to cause (or affect) the other observer (cf. Peres & Terno [47, 48]).
Whatever statistics can be made (by Bob or Charles) from data collected by Bob before
Alice’s choices or results become available to Charles – it will be completely unaffected by
the behavior of Alice and her detector.
But something else from Alice becomes known to Bob faster than light – conditional in-
formation. Conditional information is information deduced from what – given past and
present observations available to a local observer – is known from theory but is not ob-
served itself by this observer. Additional observations may make conditional information
more precise. But as long as part of the data in the condition is not yet known, nothing
conclusive is known. Having about tomorrow’s weather the conditional information that
’Should there be no clouds it will not rain’ tells in fact nothing useful about the weather
tomorrow, unless we have information about tomorrow’s clouds.
Similarly, Bob gets conditional information of the kind: ’Should Alice have measured X
then her result was Y.’ Because Bob does not know whether the hypothesis holds, he knows
nothing useful. Bob’s claimed knowledge about the results of Alice’s measurement is sound
only if Alice actually measured something. If she instead took a nap, or if her detector
failed because of a power outage, Bob concluded something wrongly.
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Causality only demands that information flow is limited by the speed of light. Nothing in
relativity forbids conditional information to be passed faster than light. For example, we
know lots of conditional information about what can or cannot happen inside black holes
although no information can flow out from there. Such conditional information is obtained
from theory independent of observation. But theoretical conclusions apply instantaneously
and have no speed limit.
In Bell-type experiments, the conditional information and the correlations become actual
only when someone (like Charles) has access to the actual data resolving the condition. It
is easily seen that extended causality is observed.
One may ask, however, how it is possible that, in actual long-distance entanglement experi-
ments performed in the past, when Charles checked the findings he found Alice’s conditonal
information unconditionally satisfied. The reason for this is that, when preparing actual
long-distance entanglement experiments, the experimenters make sure that nothing will
interrupt the expected flow of events needed for a correct experimental performance. This
means that they in fact prepare not only the source of the entangled photon pairs but
also Alice’s and Bob’s environment and the whole environment the photons traverse during
the experiment. This preparation must be careful enough to exclude all events that would
cause unexpected changes to the intended protocol or remove the delicate entanglement.
But this means that the preparation deposits in the past light cones of both Alice and Bob
enough correlated classical information that influences the present of Alice and Bob when
they perform their choices. This doesn”t explain everything about the observed correlations
but casts some doubt on the validity of the stringent assumptions made in derivations of
Bell-type inequalites.
5 Conclusion
The thermal interpretation
• acknowledges that there is only one world;
• has no split between classical and quantum mechanics – the former emerges naturally as
the macroscopic limit of the latter;
• is by design compatible with the classical ontology of ordinary thermodynamics;
• is description-dependent but observer-independent, hence free from subjective elements;
• is about both real systems and idealized systems, at every level of idealization;
• applies both to single quantum objects (like a quantum dot, a neutron star, or the
universe) and to statistical populations;
• satisfies the principles of locality and Poincare invariance, as defined in relativistic quan-
tum field theory;
• is compatible with relativistic extended causality;
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• uses no concepts beyond what is taught in every quantum physics course;
• involves no philosophically problematic steps.
No other interpretation combines these merits. The thermal interpretation leads to a gain in
clarity of thought. This results in saving a lot of time otherwise spent in the contemplation
of aspects arising in traditional interpretations, which from the point of view of the thermal
interpretation appear as meaningless or irrelevant side problems.
The thermal interpretation of quantum physics (including quantum mechanics, statistical
mechanics and quantum field theory) is an interpretation of everything. It allows a consis-
tent quantum description of the universe from the smallest to the largest levels of modeling,
including its classical aspects.
These foundations are easily stated and motivated since they are essentially the founda-
tions used everywhere for uncertainty quantification, just slightly extended to accommodate
quantum effects by not requiring that q-observables commute.
In all traditional interpretations of quantum physics, the theoretical ’observables’ are un-
observable operators. It is no surprise that calling unobservable things observables causes
apparent indeterminism. It was a historical misnomer that lead to the strange, unfortunate
situation in the foundations of quantum physics that persists now for nearly hundred years.
On the other hand, in the thermal interpretation of quantum physics, the theoretical observ-
ables (the beables in the sense of Bell) are the expectations and functions of them. They
satisfy a deterministic dynamics. Some of these beables are practically (approximately)
observable. In particular, q-expectations of Hermitian quantities and q-probabilities, the
probabilities associated with appropriate self-adjoint Hermitian quantities, are among the
theoretical observables. The q-expectations are approximately measured by reproducible
single measurements of macroscopic quantities, or by sample means in a large number of
observations on independent, similarly prepared microscopic systems. The q-probabilities
are approximately measured by determining the relative frequencies of corresponding events
associated with a large number of independent, similarly prepared systems.
This eliminates all foundational problems that were introduced into quantum physics by
basing the foundations on an unrealistic concept of observables and measurement. With
the thermal interpretation, the measurement problem turns from a philosophical riddle
into a scientific problem in the domain of quantum statistical mechanics, namely how the
quantum dynamics correlates macroscopic readings from an instrument with properties of
the state of a measured microscopic system. This problem will be discussed in Part III [39].
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